Through IPCS
By Dr. Sandip Kumar Mishra *
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Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida visited India in March this year. In a joint press conference with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Kishida raised the issue of Russia’s “aggression” against Ukraine. The difference between Japanese and Indian positions is reported as a “gap” on a contemporary critical global issue. Some commentators have gone so far as to question the depth of the bilateral relationship on this basis. Before jumping to such hasty conclusions, however, it is important to understand the different layers of the India-Japan relationship. Where do they converge, where do they diverge, and is there room for the two to coexist?
Convergences
Kishida’s recent visit led to a joint statement entitled “Partnership for a peaceful, stable and prosperous post-COVID world.” In an Indian Express opinion piece published to coincide with the trip, Kishida referred to “universal values such as freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law,” shared by the two “special, strategic and global partners.” In fact, India and Japan are marking 70 years of diplomatic relations this year as well.
Bilateral ties have been very positive over the past seven decades, with the exception of a single period of stress following the 1998 nuclear tests in India. Both countries recognize each other’s complementarities and have strong economic, strategic, historical and cultural connections. India is one of the international beneficiaries of Japanese investment in human and economic development projects. Both countries have gradually moved to articulate their common security concerns. Their defense and security ties have been strengthened, and they are now hosting the annual summit and 2 + 2 meetings.
India and Japan have a lot in common regionally and globally. They are concerned about the growth of an “assertive China”, while it involves it in a very substantial way from an economic point of view. Even if China is both India’s and Japan’s number one trading partner, its potential dominance in Asia could be the most important aspect of the New Delhi-Tokyo bilateral relationship. However, while China’s role and responsibility for the COVID-19 pandemic and its aggressive regional action are hotly debated, including in India and Japan, both bilateral trade between New Delhi and Tokyo with Beijing has been stable. In fact, the numbers have skyrocketed.
Moreover, India and Japan are part of the Quad with the USA and Australia. Although India does not have a formal security alliance with the United States, ties have deepened substantially in recent years. India and Japan are also cooperating closely through their respective Indo-Pacific strategies. Japan became a permanent member of the Malabar naval exercise in 2015, when it became a trilateral format. New Delhi and Tokyo are also involved with the ASEAN countries and consider the role of the central group in any future political, economic and regional security architecture.
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divergence
There are also some important gaps between the two countries’ foreign policy approaches. These are the products of historical and structural factors. The first gap is the type and extent of autonomy that both countries are seeking from the United States. While Japan has historically aligned its security interests with the United States – a 1953 ally – India keeps its years of non-alignment as a point of reference. With regard to nuclear and missile issues and the environment, Japan takes positions similar to those of the United States. India, on the other hand, is trying to articulate positions based on its own realities. There are gaps in prospects for North Korea, Iran and, most recently, Ukraine.
India enjoyed a long and time-tested relationship with the former USSR and later with Russia. During the Cold War, India received significant assistance from the USSR. The country’s defense sector is closely linked to / depends on Russia. New Delhi’s approach to Moscow in the Ukraine crisis is thus based on historical and structural foundations. The power of India and Japan to give space to their respective positions when views differ is a testament to the implicit understanding of the relationship. They are unlikely to allow differences of opinion on extending cooperation in the areas of convergence.
A closer look thus shows that any gap in Indian and Japanese positions vis-à-vis Ukraine – or any other issue – does not indicate a weakening of the relationship. On the contrary, it suggests maturity.
* Dr. Sandip Kumar Mishra is an Associate Professor, Center for East Asian Studies, SIS, JNU and Distinguished, IPCS.